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Abstract: 
This paper examines insolvency at the highest levels of French soccer. Between 1970 and 
2014 we observed 72 cases of insolvency arising from participation in the top two or three 
(since 1993) divisions. We find that demand (attendance) shocks can account for insolvency 
to a significant degree. We also find that insolvency can be explained by ownership structure, 
with the tradition Association form being more likely to lead to insolvency. We also examine 
the post-insolvency performance of soccer clubs and find that the adverse consequences of 
insolvency are long lasting. 
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Introduction 
 
Insolvency is a systematic problem in the world of European soccer. In 2012 UEFA, the 
governing body of European soccer reported that 56% of clubs failed to meet at least one of 
the following criteria: no negative net equity, no qualification by the auditors as to whether 
the business was a going concern and no overdues payable (UEFA (2012), see also 
Szymanski, 2015, chapter 8). This paper examines insolvency at the highest levels of French 
soccer. Between 1970 and 2014 we observed 72 cases of insolvency arising from 
participation in the top two or three (since 1993) divisions, a population of 56 to 78 clubs.1 
In this paper, our objective is to explain the causes and consequences of insolvencies in 
French soccer. Szymanski (2012) examined data for English soccer clubs in the top four 
divisions (92 clubs) and found a similar incidence of insolvency (67 cases between 1982 and 
2010). His results suggested that insolvency could be explained by negative productivity 
shocks (underperformance of the players) or negative demand shocks (revenues falling below 
expected levels). We also find that demand shocks can account for insolvency to a significant 
degree. We also examine the post-insolvency performance of soccer clubs and find that the 
adverse consequences of insolvency are long lasting. 
Our paper is structured as follows. First we review the literature on insolvencies in European 
soccer. Section 3 explains the evolution of French insolvency law and section 4 examines the 
organization of professional soccer in France. Section 5 describes our data on insolvency and 
section 6 reports our regression results. The last section concludes. 
 
Literature review of insolvencies in European soccer 
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There is now a substantial literature on the financial problems of European soccer clubs (see 
e.g. the Special Issue by Journal of Sports Economics introduced by Lago, Simmons and 
Szymanski, 2006) but, as yet, few studies on the topic of insolvencies. Buraimo, Simmons 
and Szymanski (2006) in their discussion of the financial problems of English clubs do not 
deal with specifically on insolvencies but refer to them. They note that the usual reasons cited 
to explain why clubs amass high levels of indebtedness are an inability to sell players as 
assets through the transfer market, a loss of revenues consequent on relegation, an inability to 
align costs and revenues following relegation, an inability to maintain loan payments on 
capital expenditure such as a new stadium, and a failure to realize expected revenues from 
TV broadcasting deals.  
Beech, Horsman and Magraw (2008, 2010) identify five types of insolvencies in English 
soccer: 
1. clubs that have failed to cope with relegation; 
2. clubs that have failed to pay monies due to the government; 
3. clubs that have seen ‘soft’ debt become ‘hard’ debt; 
4. clubs that have lost the ownership of their stadium; 
5. ‘repeat offenders’. 
As the authors indicate, these types are not mutually exclusive. Szymanski (2012) uses a 
unique database of financial accounts for English soccer clubs between 1973/74 and 2009/10 
to examine the causes of insolvency. Two hypotheses (also not mutually exclusive) are 
considered. The first is “irrational exuberance”, meaning that owners attempt to achieve a 
significant improvement in league position which is not affordable, leading to financial crisis. 
The second is that club finances are subject to negative shocks – either to productivity (on the 
field) or to demand – and that a series of such shocks can lead to insolvency. His empirical 
model provides evidence in support of the negative shocks hypothesis. 
4 
Barajas and Rodríguez (2010) use a logistic regression to explain why some clubs are under 
administration in Spanish soccer. They rely on a sample of 35 clubs in 2008, of which six 
were in the legal insolvency process of administration in that year. Their selected explanatory 
variables are mainly financial ones: financing rate (the ratio of short term debt to current 
assets), indebtedness (Total Debts / Total Assets), the ratio of total revenues to debt, the ratio 
of staff expenses to operating revenues and the ratio short-term to long-term debt. They also 
include the division that a given club belongs to. They find no significant impact of their 
explanatory variables on the likelihood that a club has entered the administration process.  
Barajas and Rodríguez (2014) analyze Spanish clubs during the period from 2007 until 2011, 
using Altman’s models to classify clubs according to their Z-score values (Altman, 1968, 
2000; Altman, Haldeman & Narayanan, 1977). They note that Spanish soccer is in very poor 
financial condition with most of clubs being at risk of going bankrupt. The authors identify a 
number of steps required to restore financial stability including raising equity from the capital 
markets or club members, revenue enhancement, wage cuts and working to reduce current 
liabilities. 
 
Insolvency laws in France 
 
Under French law any debtor unable to meet its obligations is liable to enter a “collective 
insolvency proceeding” (Bayle, 2009). A major landmark in the development of this process 
was the law 67-563 of 13 July 1967 which was intended to protect debtors from their 
creditors while preparing a recovery plan (Stankiewicz Murphy, 2011).2 
In line with developments in insolvency laws in the US and other European countries, the 
legal treatment of insolvency shifted in favor of debtor companies in 1980s (Stankiewicz 
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Murphy, 2011). Tetley and Bayle (2009) summarize the sequence of relevant laws from 1984 
to 2005: 
• 1984: The law 84-148 of 1st March 1984 introduced early warning procedures, which 
obliged managers to report signs of financial weakness and draw up a recovery plan. A 
court-supervised procedure to reach a compromise with creditors was also introduced. 
• 1985: The law 85-98 of 25 January 1985 favored company reorganization over winding-
up proceedings. Reorganization became the guiding principle, making liquidation 
proceedings a last resort. 
• 1994: The law 94-475 of 10 June 1994 distinguished two types of collective insolvency 
proceedings: judicial reorganization and judicial liquidation. In particular, the court was 
given the ability to order liquidation of a company immediately without necessarily having 
to go through the court supervised reorganization phase. 
• 2005: The law 2005-845 of 26 July 2005 introduced four types of proceedings: 
conciliation, safeguard, judicial reorganization, and liquidation. Conciliation involves only 
limited judicial supervision, whereas the three other proceedings are more involved and 
require the court to nominate those required to carry out the work of reorganization or 
liquidation. 
 
The organization of professional soccer in France 
 
We have data on insolvencies in French soccer clubs over the period 1970-2014. We now 
document the structural changes in the organization of the competitive hierarchy.   
 
Prior to 1970 there were professional clubs participating in two divisions connected by 
promotion and relegation, and amateur clubs also operating in promotion/relegation 
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hierarchy, but no automatic promotion/relegation link between the amateur and professional 
divisions. Beginning in 1970 the two systems have been fully integrated into a single 
hierarchy linked by promotion and relegation. Since 1970 there have four further 
restructurings of the divisions, as set out in Table 1. Since 1993 some professional clubs 
belong to the third division as well as the top two divisions. 
The legal definition of soccer clubs has also changed several times in recent decades. Until 
around 1990, most of clubs were member associations and supported by local authorities 
through direct subsidies. Some clubs were defined as mixed economy companies (“sociétés 
d’économie mixte”, SEM), meaning that they were controlled jointly by a members’ club and 
a local government authority. A third organizational structure that some clubs adopted was 
the limited liability company with sporting object (“sociétés anonymes à objet sportif”, 
SAOS). Until 1992, the shares of such companies had to be mainly held by the association, 
but after 1992, a private partner could be the main shareholder (the association minority 
interest was still not allowed to fall below 34%). Dividend payments were not permitted 
under any of these organizational structures.  
 
Table 1 
 
In 1999 the “loi Buffet” introduced a new ownership form: professional sport limited 
company (“sociétés anonymes sportives professionnelles”, SASP). This form allows a private 
partner to own the entire capital of a club and receive dividends. By 2013/14, almost all clubs 
in the top two divisions had adopted the SASP structure (LFP/DNCG, 2014). Over the entire 
period the role of local government has decreased and reliance on commercial revenue 
streams has increased.3   
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These institutional reforms reflected changes in the commercial structure of soccer as TV 
revenues became more important, as well as a declining willingness of government to fund 
professional sport. Reform was also driven by desire to put clubs on a better financial footing, 
given the persistence of liquidity and insolvency problems. By the late 1980s insolvency was 
perceived to be a threat the stability of the championship system and this led to the creation in 
1990 of the “Direction Nationale du Contrôle de Gestion” (DNCG) to regulate the financial 
decisions of soccer clubs (Dermit-Richard, 2004).4  
The powers of the DNCG include prohibiting the recruitment of players, auditing club 
payrolls and, as a last resort, imposing relegation independently of sporting performance; see 
Gouguet & Primault, 2006. They argue that the DNCG has allowed French soccer to avoid 
the financial crisis encountered by the other major European leagues (England, Germany, 
Italy and Spain). Andreff (2007), however, claims that the DNCG has not been able to 
effectively control the financial problems of French clubs, mainly because of the lack of 
transparency and disclosure. We consider the effect that the DNCG has had on declared 
insolvencies below. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Our dataset consists of all clubs participating in the top two divisions from 1970/71 to 
1992/93 and top three divisions since 1993/94 (divisions with professional clubs). Over the 
period 1970-2014, we identified 72 cases in total.5 In eight of these cases the club became 
insolvent during the season and because of this were officially ranked last, a position not 
necessarily representative of their sporting performance when they became insolvent.6 There 
are another five cases (included in the 72 cases) where the club became insolvent at a lower 
level competition but during the season immediately following participation in one of the top 
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two or three divisions.7 Figure 1 shows the incidence of insolvency by year. While 
insolvencies appear to have been most frequent in the 1990s, there are plenty of examples at 
all times throughout the four decades. 
 
Figure 1 
 
Table 2 summarizes the 72 cases where clubs became insolvent while participating or as a 
consequence of participation in the top three divisions. As noted by Szymanski (2012), 
insolvency at the highest level of competition is rare. Only four clubs became insolvent while 
in the 1st division: Rouen (1977-1978), Reims (1978-1979), Bordeaux and Nice (both 1990-
1991). In seven cases clubs became insolvent after having been relegated from the first 
division in the previous season.8 
 
Table 2 
 
Pre-insolvency performance 
 
We now examine two indicators of team performance in the twelve years leading up to an 
insolvency event: league rank and attendance. In each division each club achieves a league 
position based on points and, if necessary, goal difference. To account for the different levels 
in the league hierarchy we convert league position into league rank in the following way: 
• teams with positions 1-20 in the first division are given ranks 1 to 20, 
• teams with positions 1-20 in the second division are given ranks 21 and 40, 
• teams with positions 1-20 in the third division are given ranks 41 and 609. 
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Figure 2 illustrates the average change in league rank leading up to the insolvency event 
(season t). It shows that on average, insolvent clubs improved their rank from t-11 (44.9) to t-
2 (33.0) before experiencing a decline in t-1 (35.0) and a larger decrease in season t (38.6). 
 
Figure 2 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the change in average attendance leading up to an insolvency event. It 
shows that on average attendance was over 4500 per game up to three years before the 
insolvency event and as high as 5224 three seasons before the event (t-3), falling to 4428 in t-
2, 3973 in t-1 and 2888 in t.10 
 
Figure 3 
 
It is striking that attendance start to decline for clubs about to become insolvent earlier than 
the decline in league rank. One interpretation is that insolvency is driven by falling revenues 
(in essence, a demand shock), rather than underperformance on the field. Figure 4 represents 
the average ratio between attendance and (81 - league rank). It suggests that clubs of a given 
rank generate lower attendance as they approach insolvency, a finding also consistent with 
the idea that insolvency is driven by demand shocks. 
 
Figure 4 
 
Post insolvency performance 
The consequences of insolvency are illustrated in Figure 5. It shows that the average team 
position fell from 38.6 in t (the season of the insolvency event) to 66.2 in t+1 and never rose 
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above 60 in the 12 years after the insolvency event (t+12). This decline is roughly equivalent 
to playing a full division lower following the insolvency event without any tendency to 
recover. This result contrasts with Szymanski (2012) who finds that in English soccer there is 
a strong tendency for performance to recover to pre-insolvency level within a few years.  
 
Figure 5 
 
Table 3 shows what happened to all relegated clubs in our population, whether insolvent or 
not. It reports the percentage of relegated clubs that are promoted back within five and ten 
years, depending on the division from which they were relegated.11 As a whole, it is more 
difficult to regain previous level within a given period of time after an insolvency compared 
to all relegations. 
 
Table 3 
 
Regression analysis 
 
The descriptive statistics suggest that shocks to demand -declining attendance for a given 
level of team performance – are associated with insolvencies. We now develop a regression 
model to test if there is a causal relationship. Our regression strategy is to estimate a 
relationship between league performance and attendance (which we take to be a proxy for 
revenues12) and then to use the residuals from this regression as explanatory variables in a 
probit regression for insolvency.  
Following Leach (2006) we adopt an error correction framework; our 
performance/attendance regression model is defined as:  
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∆relattit = γ0 + γ1lnrelattit-1 + γ2∆lnrelattit-1 + γ3lnpit-1 + γ4∆lnpit + γ5lnrelpop + main club 
dummy + promotion/relegation dummies + division/tier dummies + performance/tier 
interaction dummies + ηit           (1) 
Where relatt is the average attendance of the club divided by the sum of all clubs’ average 
attendances in that season, lnp is league rank, relpop is the population of the club urban area13 
divided by the sum of all urban areas with at least one club, and “main club” is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the club is the main club in its urban area and 0 otherwise. Since we are 
using (1) to obtain best linear unbiased predictors of attendance (revenue), rather than 
estimates of the structural parameters, we do not need to assume the exogeneity of the right 
hand side variables. 
Table 4 presents the results of the regressions for attendance. The results are intuitive: higher 
attendances are associated with clubs with higher league positions, participating in higher 
league divisions and playing in urban areas with larger populations Promoted clubs enjoy a 
significant boost to attendance while relegated teams lose support.14 Besides, we find similar 
signs and significances compared to Szymanski (2012) for English soccer. 
 
Table 4 
 
The main focus of interest here is the residuals from (1). We chose to use the residuals from 
the fixed effects specification in Table 4 to estimate the probability of insolvency (Table 5). 
In addition we included variables indicating (i) legal status (company or association), (ii) 
divisional status (first, second or third) (iii) the presence of the DNCG or amateur control 
regulatory regimes. 
 
Table 5 
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Columns 1-6 of Table 5 differ according to the number of residuals used. Thus column 1 uses 
residuals in t, column 2 adds residuals in t-1, and so on until t-5. This captures the idea that 
insolvency can be triggered by a sequence of negative shocks. The residuals are of the right 
sign (negative) and significant for each regression from t to t:t-3. Note that although the 
coefficient is larger when only the more recent shocks are included, a longer history also 
means a greater cumulative effect.  
Association (meaning the organizational structure) has a positive sign and is significant for 
each regression. Note that Associations tend to have a broader membership base than other 
organizational forms, and so the results may suggest that more concentrated ownership forms 
are less prone to financial distress. Not surprisingly, clubs in lower divisions are more likely 
to enter insolvency. However, the regulatory organizations- the DNCG and Amateur club 
control body do not appear to have had any impact on insolvencies, consistent with the views 
of Andreff (2007).  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, our objective was to examine the causes of insolvency in French soccer over the 
period 1970-2014. Our dataset included all professional soccer clubs operating during this 
period.  
We estimate the impact of demand shocks, calculated by estimating the difference between 
actual and expected attendance levels, based on team performance, club fixed effects and 
other relevant variables. Our results show that negative demand shocks significantly increase 
the likelihood of insolvency. The cumulative effect of these shocks can extend up to three 
seasons prior to the insolvency event. These findings are very similar to those of Szymanski 
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(2012), whose data covered a similar period and who used a similar methodology for the case 
English professional soccer. 
Indeed, although the regulatory regimes are quite different, insolvency seems to present itself 
in a similar way in both soccer league systems. Over the period 1970-2014, 72 insolvencies 
occurred in French professional soccer, more than in English professional soccer (Szymanski, 
2012). Because there are fewer professional clubs in France, there are fewer club-years in our 
data – 2634 versus 3404 in the English professional soccer dataset. This means that the 
frequency of insolvencies per club-year was 2.7% in France compared to 2.0% in England. 
These figures appear broadly similar. 
We also find that insolvency can be explained by ownership structure, with the tradition 
Association form being more likely to lead to insolvency. The Association model usually 
entails less concentrated ownership, and often a lesser degree of financial backing, which 
may help to explain this result. 
Our results have important policy implications. First, the idea of giving fans more power 
through ownership is a popular one at the moment, while our results suggest that this might 
increase financial instability. Second, while insolvency is often attributed to overambitious 
expansion by the club management, it may be that simple bad luck plays a more important 
role. Considering post insolvency events, we find that clubs frequently struggle to achieve the 
same level of competition again, mainly because of the difference of level between t and t+1. 
This raises the question of whether penalties by the French soccer authorities are justified or 
not. If not, there is an important concern given that they can prevent a club from regaining its 
previous level, with the negative economic and social consequences associated to this. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1
 Football clubs play in leagues that are connected through the system of promotion and relegation which 
enables clubs to move to a higher level based on sporting merit, replacing those that perform poorly (this is in 
sharp contrast to the American model in which teams do not move between different levels of competition). 
Given this pyramid structure, there is a large number of clubs operating below this level and many of these have 
also become insolvent, but these cases are harder to document. 
2
 This procedure was limited to entities that could prove (a) the financial situation was not irreparable (b) there 
would be a full and speedy recovery prospects and (c) liquidation would be damaging to either the regional or 
the national economy. In practice the law did little to preserve insolvent businesses. 
3
 Until the end of the 1980s clubs obtained about 50% of the revenues from gate receipts, 30% form sponsorship 
and 20% from local government subsidies. TV revenues were negligible. Since then the contribution of TV 
rights has risen to around 50% of the total, gate revenues has fallen to as little as 10%, and public subsidies have 
almost disappeared (see Andreff (2012) and LFP/DNCG (2012, 2014)). 
4
 Between 1990/91 and 1992/93, the DNCG regulated clubs in the top two divisions (56 clubs); from 1993/94 to 
1995/96, clubs in the top three divisions (78 clubs); from 1996/97, clubs for the top two divisions (38 to 42 
clubs) whereas clubs in third division have been regulated by the control committee for federal (amateur) 
championships (Dermit-Richard, 2004). 
5
 We identified insolvent clubs using several sources: http://fr.wikipedia.org/, http://footballenfrance.fr/, 
http://www.savoie-foot.com/savoiefoot/CFA/, http://www.rsssf.com/players/trainers-fran-clubs.html, a 
document from the French football league entitled “Rapport moral saison 1990-1991” (Pukan, 1991) and a PhD 
by Durand (1994). We found their divisions on http://footballenfrance.fr/. A data appendix listing all the clubs 
and the events surrounding insolvency is available from page 26.  
6
 For these clubs, we chose to use data in our analysis from the previous season. For example, AC Ajaccio 
became insolvent after three games during the season 1974-1975. In our analysis, we consider this insolvency as 
having occurred at the end of 1973-1974. The only exception is Saint-Brieuc in 1996-1997 as this is the only 
club that became insolvent in-season for which we could find both their sporting performance and their 
attendance when they became insolvent. This is also the only club that got promoted the previous season. 
7
 (i) Reims which became insolvent in 1991-1992 when being in 3rd division and after having been relegated 
from 2nd division for financial difficulties (ii) Tours and Gap which became insolvent respectively in 1993-
1994 and 2011-2012 when being in 4th division and after having been relegated from 3rd division for financial 
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difficulties, (iii) Uzès which became insolvent in 2014-2015 when being in 5th division and after having been 
relegated from 3rd division both for sporting and financial reasons (iv) Cassis-Carnoux which became insolvent 
in 2010-2011 when being in 7th division and after having been relegated from 3rd division both for sporting and 
financial reasons. 
8
 Rennes in 1977-1978, Troyes in 1978-1979, Marseille in 1980-1981 and 1994-1995 (relegated for 
administrative reasons in 1993-1994), Angers in 1981-1982, Valenciennes in 1982-1983 and Brest in 1991-1992 
(relegated for financial difficulties in 1990-1991). Ajaccio (relegated from the first division in 1972-1973) 
became insolvent in 1974-1975 after having played only three games. 
9
 The appendix describes the normalization in more detail. 
10
 We were not able to obtain a complete attendance record for all of the clubs. Out of the 72 cases of 
insolvency, we found 48, 49 or 50 attendances from t-12 to t-9, 53 in t-8, 56 in t-7 and t-6, 59 in t-5 and t-4, 60 
in t-3, 64 in t-2, 65 in t-1 and 68 in t. For the latter, the four missing cases correspond to two insolvent clubs 
excluded in-season (Nevers in 1993-1994 and Roubaix in 1995-1996), Pau in 1994-1995 and Quimper in 1996-
1997. If we look at attendance for those clubs for which we have a complete record over six seasons (51 cases), 
the pattern is confirmed: on average attendance was 5442 in t-6, 5622 in t-5, 5363 in t-4, 5841 in t-3, 5050 in t-
2, 4611 in t-1 and 3341 in t. 
11
 Only 50 cases of insolvencies are included here. Of the remaining insolvency cases 13 clubs were not 
relegated, one disappeared (Nevers in 1994) and eight clubs have had not sufficient time to regain their previous 
level (i.e. these clubs were relegated by more divisions than the number of seasons since played). When 
extending to 10 years, four other cases are excluded as they can still regain their previous level within 10 years 
at the time of writing this paper. 
12
 Unlike English clubs, accounting data for wages and revenues are unavailable for French football clubs across 
all seasons. Hence we use average annual attendance figures as a proxy for revenue data. Attendance is one of 
the principal factors determining revenues, both directly through money received at the gate and for 
merchandise, and also indirectly since broadcasters and sponsors will pay more for rights to popular clubs (see 
e.g. Buraimo, Paramio and Campos, 2010). 
13
 We use the words urban area to refer to the French concept of “unité urbaine”. 
14
 The results are very similar in sign and significance to those found by Szymanski (2012) for English football. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Number of clubs (and groups) in the French soccer divisions from the first to the best regional over the 
period 1969-2014 
 1969-1970 1970-1972 1972-1978 1978-1993 1993-1997 1997-2014 
1st division 
(D1) 18 20 20 20 20 
18 until 2001-2002 
then 20 
2nd division 
(D2) 16 48 (3*16) 36 (2*18) 36 (2*18) 22 
22 in 1997-1998 
then 20 
3rd division 
(D3) 72 (6*12) 
75 in 1970-
1971, 81 in 
1971-1972 
(6 groups) 
96 (6*16) 96 (6*16) 36 (2*18) 20, 18 in 2013-2014 
4th division 
(D4) 
240 
(20*12) 240 (20*12) 
240 until 
1973-1974 
then 260 (20 
groups) 
112 (8*14) 72 (4*18) 
72 (4*18), 62 in 
2013-2014 (2*15 
and 2*16) 
5th division 
(D5) - - - 
260 until 
1979-1980 
(20 groups), 
273 in 1980-
1981 (21 
groups) then 
286 (22 
groups) 
112 (8*14) 
128 (8*16), 112 
from 2012-2013 
(8*14) 
6th division 
(D6) - - - - 286 (22*13) 308 (22*14) 
Total 
number of 
clubs 
346 
383 in 1970-
1971, 389 in 
1971-1972 
392 until 
1973-1974 
then 412 
524 until 
1979-1980, 
537 in 1981-
1982 then 
550 
548 
568 in 1997-1998, 
566 until 2001-
2002, 568 again 
until 2011-2012, 
552 in 2012-2013, 
540 in 2013-2014 
 
Table 2 Number of insolvencies per period and level in French soccer clubs over the period 1970-2014 
 1st division 2nd division 3
rd
 division 
(1993-2014) Total 
Entire period 5 41 26 72 
1970-1981 2 7 - 9 
1981-1992 3 23 - 26 
1992-2003 0 8 14 22 
2003-2014 0 3 12 15 
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Table 3 Consequences of relegation for all cases and cases of insolvency 
  
5 years 10 years 
  All relegations Insolvencies All relegations Insolvencies 
All divisions 
Number of cases 426 50 397 46 
Regaining 
previous level 200 13 238 15 
% 46.9% 26% 59.9% 32.6% 
1st division 
Number of cases 119 5 112 5 
Regaining 
previous level 77 3 86 3 
% 64.7% 60% 76.8% 60% 
2nd division 
Number of cases 203 26 201 25 
Regaining 
previous level 85 5 104 5 
% 41.9% 19.2% 51.7% 20% 
3rd division 
Number of cases 104 19 84 16 
Regaining 
previous level 38 5 48 7 
% 36.5% 26.3% 57.1% 43.75% 
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Table 4 Regressions explaining attendance variation in season t 
 
Attendance 
only 
Attendance and 
position 
Attendance and 
position and 
position/tier 
interaction 
Fixed 
effects 
ln(Attendance/∑Attendances) (t-1) -0.153*** (0.0175) 
-0.196*** 
(0.0163) 
-0.195*** 
(0.0159) 
-0.404*** 
(0.0258) 
∆ ln(Attendance/∑Attendances) (t-1) -0.134*** (0.0221) 
-0.102*** 
(0.0194) 
-0.102*** 
(0.0191) 
-0.0465*** 
(0.0181) 
ln (Population/∑Populations) (t) 0.0480*** (0.00663) 
0.0387*** 
(0.00582) 
0.0399*** 
(0.00563) 
0.0192 
(0.0634) 
Main club 0.268*** (0.0418) 
0.265*** 
(0.0362) 
0.274*** 
(0.0352) 
0.221* 
(0.132) 
Promotion (t-1) 0.438*** (0.0204) 
0.330*** 
(0.0215) 
0.328*** 
(0.0220) 
0.250*** 
(0.0234) 
Relegation (t-1) -0.365*** (0.0334) 
-0.309*** 
(0.0302) 
-0.329*** 
(0.0306) 
-0.213*** 
(0.0306) 
Second tier -0.153*** (0.0224) 
-0.0147 
(0.0215) 
-0.0681*** 
(0.0215) 
-0.190*** 
(0.0266) 
Third tier -0.350*** (0.0441) 
-0.176*** 
(0.0392) 
-0.0627 
(0.0557) 
-0.307*** 
(0.0666) 
P (t-1)  0.0890*** (0.00748) 
0.0445*** 
(0.00805) 
0.0474*** 
(0.0104) 
∆ P (t)  0.175*** (0.00778) 
0.107*** 
(0.00802) 
0.101*** 
(0.00845) 
P (t-1) * T2   0.0596*** (0.0118) 
0.0635*** 
(0.0148) 
∆ P (t) * T2   0.100*** (0.0140) 
0.0993*** 
(0.0142) 
P (t-1) * T3   0.148*** (0.0261) 
0.188*** 
(0.0313) 
∆ P (t) * T3   0.144*** (0.0246) 
0.167*** 
(0.0272) 
Constant -0.611*** (0.0781) 
-0.922*** 
(0.0782) 
-0.855*** 
(0.0757) 
-2.228*** 
(0.494) 
Observations 2360 2360 2360 2360 
R-squared 0.407 0.541 0.557 0.618 
Number of clubs    176 
*, ** and *** mean respectively significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
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Table 5 Probit regressions explaining insolvencies 
 T t:t-1 t:t-2 t:t-3 t:t-4 t:t-5 
Association 0.280* (0.169) 
0.475*** 
(0.184) 
0.525*** 
(0.190) 
0.567*** 
(0.198) 
0.540** 
(0.214) 
0.557** 
(0.221) 
Second tier 0.669*** (0.171) 
0.650*** 
(0.174) 
0.683*** 
(0.174) 
0.699*** 
(0.176) 
0.683*** 
(0.177) 
0.699*** 
(0.179) 
Third tier 0.910*** (0.325) 
0.912*** 
(0.338) 
1.198*** 
(0.350) 
1.542*** 
(0.382) 
1.697*** 
(0.395) 
1.661*** 
(0.436) 
DNCG 0.0813 (0.197) 
0.122 
(0.204) 
0.0703 
(0.210) 
0.0535 
(0.217) 
-0.0281 
(0.234) 
-0.0750 
(0.240) 
Amateur 
control 
0.144 
(0.360) 
0.160 
(0.397) 
-0.0661 
(0.418) 
-0.304 
(0.454) 
-0.489 
(0.483) 
-0.406 
(0.520) 
Residual t -0.597** (0.236)      
Residual t:t-1  -0.594*** (0.177)     
Residual t:t-2   -0.428*** (0.157)    
Residual t:t-3    -0.297** (0.141)   
Residual t:t-4     -0.205 (0.128)  
Residual t:t-5      -0.122 (0.120) 
Constant -2.759*** (0.216) 
-2.904*** 
(0.236) 
-2.892*** 
(0.232) 
-2.900*** 
(0.239) 
-2.823*** 
(0.244) 
-2.800*** 
(0.243) 
Observations 2360 2130 1942 1786 1650 1539 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo-R² 0.077 0.098 0.111 0.122 0.127 0.128 
*, ** and *** mean respectively significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1 The frequency of insolvencies per season in French soccer clubs, 1970-2014 
 
 
Figure 2 Average team rank from year t-12 to year of insolvency (year t) 
 
 
Figure 3 Average team attendance from year t-12 to year of insolvency 
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Figure 4 Average team ratio between attendance and (81 - league rank) from t-12 to year of insolvency 
 
 
Figure 5 Average team position from year t-12 before to year t+12 after insolvency 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 Position “normalisation” 
Actual 
ranking 
22 
teams 
21 
teams 
19 
teams 
18 
teams 
17 
teams 
16 
teams 
15 
teams 
14 
teams 
13 
teams 
12 
teams 
11 
teams 
10 
teams 9 teams 8 teams 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 6 7 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 6 7 8 8 10 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 7 8 9 10 10.5 11 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 8 9 10 10.5 11 13 14 
7 7 7 7 7 7 8 9 10 10.5 11 12 13 15 17 
8 8 8 8 8 9 10 10.5 11 12 13 14 16 18 20 
9 9 9 9 10 10.5 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 20 
 
10 9.5 10 10.5 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 20 
  
11 10 10.5 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
   
12 11 11 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
    
13 11.5 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
     
14 12 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 
      
15 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 
       
16 14 15 17 18 19 20 
        
17 15 16 18 19 20 
         
18 16 17 19 20 
          
19 17 18 20 
           
20 18 19 
 
           
21 19 20 
 
           
22 20 
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Data Appendix 1:  Information related to causes of insolvencies in French football over the period 1970-2014 for each case 
 Club Season Ownership form 
“Normalised” 
sporting 
position 
(actual into 
brackets if 
different) 
Potential in terms 
of attendance 
based on best 
attendance 
position t-12/t 
Local / 
departmental1 
competitor(s) 
(“normalised” 
position into 
brackets if 
football, actual 
position if other 
sports) 
Evolution of 
“normalised” 
sporting position 
t-12/t-1 
Attendance shock or not 
according to regressions 
(residuals ≤ -0.2, t-5/t) 
1 AC Ajaccio 1975 Association 
40 
(56) 
withdraw 
23 in t-4 
GFCO Ajaccio 
(42 in t-1 and t; 
D2 in t+1) 
Between 61 and 65 
t-12/t-10, 36 in t-9, 
21 in t-8, 9 in t-7, 
18 in t-6 and t-5, 6 
in t-4, 13 in t-3, 20 
in t-2, 27 in t-1 
Shock in t-1 (-0.32) 
2 Rouen 1978 Association 20 9 in t - 
Between 4 and 16 t-
12/t-8 (4 in t-9, 
financial difficulties 
in t-8, 14) 
Between 22 and 30 
t-7/t-1 
No shock 
3 Red Star 93 1978 Association 
23 
(25) 
15 in t-3 
Paris SG (11 vs. 9 
in t-1) 
Paris FC (22 vs. 
34 in t-1) 
20 in t-12, 38 in t-
11 (fusion with 
Toulouse) 
Between 13 and 19 
t-10/t-5 
21 in t-4, 20 in t-3, 
Shock in t-2 (-0.28) and t-1 
(-0.44) 
27 
22 in t-2, 30 in t-1 
4 Rennes 1978 Association 
34 
(43) 
9 in t-4 - 
Between 6 and 19 t-
12/t-3 
21 in t-2, 20 in t-1 
Shock in t-1 (-0.24) and t (-
0.44) 
5 Reims 1979 Association 20 6 in t-5 - 
19 in t-12, 23 in t-
11, 28 in t-10, 24 in 
t-9 
Between 5 and 15 t-
8/t-1 (5 in t-3, 11 in 
t-2, 15 in t-1) 
Shock in t (-0.28) 
6 Troyes 1979 Association 
39 
(53) 
11 in t-5 - 
75 at best t-12/t-9 
35 in t-8, 22 in t-7, 
21 in t-6 
Between 15 and 19 
t-5/t-1 
Shock in t-1 (-0.20) 
7 Marseille 1981 Association 
26 
(31) 
1 in t-10 - Between 1 and 19 t-12/t-1 
Shock in t-4 (-0.32), t-2 (-
0.38) and t (-0.36) 
8 Thionville 1981 Association 
26 
(31) 
27.5 in t-1 
Metz 
(9 vs. 17 in t-1) 
61 at best t-12/t-4, 
45 in t-3, 43 in t-2, 
33 in t-1 
Data not available (decrease 
in attendance between t-1 
and t despite a better 
sporting position) 
9 Dunkerque 1981 Association 
38 
(51) 
22.5 in t-8 
Lille (17 vs. 13 in 
t-1) 
Between 23 and 38 
t-12/t-1, 24 in t-8 
and t-3, 23 in t-2, 
31 in t-1 
Shock in t-2 (-0.32) and t-1 
(-0.37) 
28 
10 Angers 1982 Association 
28 
(35) 
13 in t-8 - 
Between 4 and 21 t-
12/t-1 (21 in t-6 and 
t-4) 
Shock in t-1 (-0.36) and t (-
0.29) 
11 Valenciennes 1983 Association 
23 
(25) 
13 in t-7 - 
19 in t-12, 21 in t-
11, 18 in t-10, 22 in 
t-9, 21 in t-8, 12 in 
t-7, 17 in t-6, 14 in 
t-5, 18 in t-4, 8 in t-
3, 11 in t-2, 18 in t-
1 
Shock in t-2 (-0.25) 
12 Stade 
Français 1985 Association 
35 
(45) 
39.5 in t-3 
Paris SG (13 vs. 4 
in t-1) 
Basket (4 in t-1 
and t) 
Beyond 81 t-12/t-7, 
81 in t-6, 61 in t-5, 
41 in t-4, 33 in t-3, 
37 in t-2, 30 in t-1 
Shock in t (-0.49) 
13 Besançon 1986 Association 
36 
(47) 
20 in t-8 
Sochaux 
(15 vs. 8 in t-1) 
Between 22 and 36 
t-12/t-1, 22 and 25 
t-8/t-5, 31 in t-4, 33 
in t-3, 36 in t-2, 27 
in t-1 
Shock in t-3 (-0.34) and t-1 
(-0.47) 
14 Limoges 1987 Association 
27 
(33) 
22.5 in t-3 
Basket 
(2 vs. 3 in t-1) 
48 in t-12, 55 in t-
11, 41 in t-10, 
between 24 and 37 
t-9/t-1 (24 in t-3, 35 
in t-2, 31 in t-1) 
Shock in t (-0.29) 
15 Dunkerque 1987 Association 
28 
(35) 
27 in t-9 
Lille (14 vs. 10 in 
t-1) 
Insolvency in t-6 
(38), 34 in t-5, 25 in 
t-4, 35 in t-3, 36 in 
t-2, 35 in t-1 
Shock in t-3 (-0.31) (-0.19 in 
t-2 and t) 
16 Valenciennes 1987 Association 35 13 in t-11 - Insolvency in t-4 Shock in t-3 (-0.39) and t-1 
29 
(45) (23), 25 in t-3, 26 in 
t-2, 34 in t-1 
(-0.44) 
17 Thonon 1987 Association 
38 
(51) 
24 in t-7 Annecy (48, 42 in 
t+1 then D2) 
Between 61 and 73 
t-12/t-9, 42 in t-8, 
between 22 and 35 
t-7/t-1 (24 in t-7, 22 
in t-5, 25 in t-2, 35 
in t-1) 
Shock in t (-0.52) 
18 Amiens 1987 Association 
39 
(53) 
24 in t-11 - 
28 in t-12, 25 in t-
11, between 39 and 
46 t-10/t-2, 42 in t-
1 
No shock in t, 
no data from t-1 to t-5 
19 Bastia 1988 Association 
28 
(35) 
21.5 in t-9 - Between 3 and 20 t-12/t-2, 25 in t-1 
Shock in t-3 (-0.81), t-2 (-
0.51) and t (-0.28) 
20 Mulhouse 1989 Mixed economy 
company 21 18 in t-6 - 
Between 35 and 44 
t-12/t-8, 22 in t-7, 
20 in t-6, 27 in t-5, 
22/23 t-4/t-1 
No shock 
21 Orléans 1989 Association 
31 
(39) 
27.5 in t-4 - 
46 in t-12, 41 in t-
11, between 24 and 
33 t-10/t-1 (24 in t-
4, 27 in t-3, 33 in t-
2, 25 in t-1) 
Shock in t-3 (-0.43) and t-1 
(-0.57) 
22 Beauvais 1989 Association 
36 
(47) 
30 in t-3 - 
Between 57 and 71 
t-12/t-6, 46 in t-5, 
41 in t-4, 33 in t-3, 
26 in t-2, 35 in t-1 
Shock in t-2 (-0.43) 
23 Sète 1989 Association 37 31 in t-2 Montpellier 40 in t-12, between 
45 and 53 t-11/t-7, 
Shock in t-1 (-0.49) 
30 
(49) (9 vs. 3 in t-1) 
Volley 
(5 vs. 2 in t-1) 
41 in t-6, between 
24 and 34 t-5/t-1 
(24 in t-3, 34 in t-1) 
24 Grenoble 1990 Association 
38 
(51) 
26 in t-6 
Hockey 
(2 vs. 5 in t-1) 
Rugby 
(5 in t-1 and t) 
Volley 
(6 vs. 2 in t-1) 
Between 43 and 46 
t-12/t-10, 27 and 34 
t-9/t-5, 40 in t-4, 42 
in t-3, 30 in t-2, 33 
in t-1 
Shock in t (-0.48) 
25 Lorient 1990 Association 
38 
(51) 
21 in t-4 - 
58 in t-12 
(insolvency), 79 in 
t-11, 95 in t-10, 101 
in t-9, 95 in t-8, 81 
in t-7, 61 in t-6, 
between 38 and 41 
t-5/t-1 (41 in t-5, 38 
in t-4, 41 in t-3, 40 
in t-2, 41 in t-1) 
No shock in t (-0.18), 
no data from t-1 to t-5 
26 Abbeville 1990 Association 
39 
(53) 
23 in t-9 
Amiens 
(62, 41 in t+1) 
62 in t-12, 61 in t-
11, 41 in t-10, 
between 30 and 37 
t-9/t-1 
No shock 
27 Quimper 1990 Association 
40 
(55) 
26 in t-1 
Brest 
(10, 8 in t-3) 
Between 34 and 40 
t-12/t-8, 43 in t-7, 
between 24 and 37 
t-6/t-1 (25 in t-3, 36 
Shock in t-3 (-0.71) 
31 
in t-2, 24 in t-1) 
28 Bordeaux 1991 Association 10 2 in t-1 
Rugby 
(1 vs. 9 in t-1) 
Volley 
(2 vs. 5 in t-1) 
Handball (3) 
Hockey 
(3 vs. 5 in t-1) 
10 in t-12, between 
1 and 6 t-11/t-3 (1 
in t-7 and t-6, 3 in t-
5, 1 in t-4), 13 in t-
2, 2 in t-1 
No shock 
29 Nice 1991 Association 14 10 in t-5 
Cannes 
(4 vs. 11 in t-1) 
Between 15 and 19 
t-12/t-9, 23 in t-8, 
22 in t-7, 21 in t-6, 
8 in t-5, 11 in t-4, 
16 in t-3, 6 in t-2, 
18 in t-1 
No shock 
30 Niort 1991 Association 
37 
(49) 
11 in t-3 - 
58 at best t-12/t-7, 
41 in t-6, 25 in t-5, 
21 in t-4, 18 in t-3, 
36 in t-2, 27 in t-1 
No shock (-0.19 in t-1) 
31 Chaumont 1991 Association 
37 
(49) 
31 in t-5 - 
31 in t-12, 40 in t-
11, between 43 and 
50 t-10/t-7, 41 in t-
6, 39 in t-5, 42 in t-
4, 50 in t-3, 41 in t-
2, 37 in t-1 
No shock in t, t-1 and t-5, 
other data not available 
32 Dijon 1991 Association 40 24.5 in t-3 Basket (6) 63 at best t-12/t-10, 
56 in t-9, 57 in t-8, 
No shock from t to t-3, data 
not available for t-4 and t-5 
32 
(55) 46 in t-7, 57 in t-6 
and t-5, 41 in t-4, 
37 in t-3, 26 in t-2, 
31 in t-1 
33 Orléans 1992 Association 
39 
(53) 
27.5 in t-7 - 
Insolvency in t-3 
(31), 34 in t-2, 38 in 
t-1 
Shock in t-4 (-0.57), t-2 (-
0.24) and t (-0.35) 
34 Brest 1992 Association 
40 
(56) 
withdraw 
10 in t-10 - 
20 in t-12, 21 in t-
11, between 8 and 
17 t-10/t-5, 19 in t-
4, 21 in t-3, 10 in t-
2, 11 in t-1 
Shock in t-2 (-0.32) (-0.19 in 
t-4) 
35 Reims 1992 Association 
46 
(87) 
14 in t-9 
Basket (15 in t vs. 
12 in t-1) 
Hockey 
(5 in t-1 and t) 
Between 22 and 34 
t-12/t-1 (34 in t-7, 
24 in t-6 and t-5, 27 
in t-4, 30 in t-3, 27 
in t-2, 26 in t-1, 
financial 
difficulties) 
Shock in t-4 (-0.23) and t-3 
(-0.24) 
36 Rodez 1993 Association 
36 
(47) 
28 in t-4 - 
101 in t-12, 81 in t-
11, 75 in t-10, 61 in 
t-9, 46 in t-8, 45 in 
t-7, 44 in t-6, 41 in 
t-5, 38 in t-4, 41 in 
t-3, 28 in t-2, 26 in 
t-1 
No shock in t, other data not 
available 
37 La Roche 1994 
Limited 
company 
(minority 
blocking rights 
for the 
47 
(55) 
30 in t-10 - 
44 in t-12, 42 in t-
11, 39 in t-10 and t-
9, 42 in t-8, 
between 36 and 38 
t-7/t-4, 34 in t-3, 36 
Shock in t-2 (-0.34), t-1 (-
0.28) and t (-0.92) 
33 
supportive 
association) 
in t-2, 38 in t-1 
38 Annecy 1994 
Limited 
company 
(minority 
blocking rights 
for the 
supportive 
association) 
60 
(77) 
withdraw 
25 in t-5 - 
64 in t-12, 63 in t-
11, 61 in t-10, 
between 42 and 48 
t-9/t-6, 34 in t-5, 36 
in t-4, 30 in t-3, 37 
in t-2, 39 in t-1 
Shock in t-3 (-0.24) 
39 Nevers 1994 Association 
60 
(77) 
withdraw 
26.5 in t-20 
(no data t-12/t) 
Formula 1 
(Magny-Cours, 
1991/2008) 
71 at best t-12/t-7, 
61 in t-6, 55 in t-5, 
44 in t-4 and t-3, 56 
in t-2, 43 in t-1 
Data not available 
40 Tours 1994 Association 
74 
(123) 
7 in t-12 - 
11 in t-12, 18 in t-
11, 21 in t-10, 19 in 
t-9, 30 in t-8, 27 in 
t-7, 39 in t-6, 41 in 
t-5, 36 in t-4, 30 in 
t-3 and t-2, 37 in t-1 
(financial 
difficulties) 
Shock in t-4 (-0.24) and t-3 
(-0.27) 
41 Marseille 1995 
Limited 
company 
(minority 
blocking rights 
for the 
supportive 
association) 
21 1 in t-5 
Marseille 
Vitrolles Handball 
(2 vs. 1 in t-1) 
24 in t-12, 21 in t-
11, 17 in t-10, 12 in 
t-9, 2 in t-8, 6 in t-
7, 1 t-6/t-2, 2 in t-1 
No shock 
42 Rouen 1995 Association 46 6 in t-12 Hockey 16 in t-12, 14 in t-
11, 18 in t-10, 39 in 
Shock in t (-0.73) 
34 
(53) (1 in t-1 and t) t-9, 42 in t-8, 24 in 
t-6, 33 in t-5, 
between 23 and 27 
t-5/t-2, 37 in t-1 
43 Bourges 1995 Mixed economy 
company 
47 
(55) 
24 in t-3 
Women’s basket 
(1 vs. 5 in t-1) 
58 in t-12, 55 in t-
11, 56 in t-10, 
between 39 and 42 
t-9/t-5, 35 in t-4, 28 
in t-3, 27 in t-2, 39 
in t-1 
Shock in t (-0.42) 
44 Pau 1995 Association 
54 
(65) 
No data t-12/t 
Basket 
(3 vs. 4 in t-1) 
62 in t-12, between 
43 and 53 t-11/t-6, 
55 in t-5, 58 in t-4, 
51 in t-3, 41 in t-2, 
48 in t-1 
Data not available 
45 Valenciennes 1996 Association 
43 
(47) 
9 in t-3 - 
Insolvency in t-9 
(35), between 22 
and 29 t-8/t-5, 21 in 
t-4, 18 in t-3, 38 in 
t-2, 57 in t-1 
No shock 
46 Roubaix 1996 Association 
60 
(78) 
withdraw 
39 in t-12 Lille (14 in t-1) 
40 in t-12, 55 in t-
11, 57 in t-10, 59 in 
t-9, between 63 and 
77 t-8/t-5, 61 in t-4, 
45 in t-3, 54 in t-2, 
59 in t-1 
Data not available 
47 Perpignan 1997 Association 
34 
(36) 
25 in t-5 
Rugby 
(5 vs. 9 in t-1) 
81 in t-12, 61 in t-
11, between 42 and 
46 t-10/t-7, 41 in t-
6, 27 in t-5, 37 in t-
4, 42 in t-3, 34 in t-
No shock in t, other data not 
available 
35 
2, 28 in t-1 
48 Saint-Brieuc 1997 Association 
40 (42) 
withdraw 
33 (35) when 
insolvent 
24 in t-2 
Guingamp 
(12 vs. 10 in t-1) 
63 in t-12, 79 at 
best t-11/t-7, 61 in 
t-6, 46 in t-5, 41 in 
t-4, 26 in t-3, 37 in 
t-2, 41 in t-1 
Data not available 
49 Quimper 1997 Association 
53 
(63) 
26 in t-8 Brest (57) 
Insolvency in t-7 
(40), 45 in t-6, 55 in 
t-5, 45 in t-4, 55 in 
t-3, 58 in t-2, 51 in 
t-1 
Data not available 
50 Toulon 1998 Association 38 14 in t-12 
Rugby 
(15 vs. 13 in t-1) 
Basket 
(27 vs. 24 in t-1) 
Between 5 and 16 t-
12/t-6, 19 in t-5 
(financial 
difficulties), 44 in t-
4, 58 in t-3, 41 in t-
2, 34 in t-1 
Data not available 
51 Poitiers 1998 Association 47 31.5 in t-2 
Volley 
(4 vs. 5 in t-1) 
51 at best t-12/t-4, 
43 in t-3, 37 in t-2, 
43 in t-1 
Data not available 
52 Epinal 1998 Association 56 38 in t-2 - 
44 at best t-12/t-9, 
41 in t-8, 35 in t-7 
and t-6, 38 in t-5, 
53 in t-4, 41 in t-3, 
36 in t-2, 39 in t-1 
Shock in t-5 (-0.30) and t (-
0.20) 
53 Charleville 1998 Association 
60 
withdraw 
30 in t-5 
Sedan 
(42 vs. 46 in t-1) 
Between 48 and 56 
t-12/t-8, 43 in t-7, 
41 in t-6, 30 in t-5, 
29 in t-4, 30 in t-3, 
No shock in t, t-1 and t-2, 
other data not available 
36 
35 in t-2, 37 in t-1 
(financial 
difficulties) 
54 Bourges 1998 Mixed economy 
company 
60 
withdraw 
24 in t-6 Women’s basket (1 in t-1 and t) 
Insolvency in t-3 
(47), 61 in t-2, 48 in 
t-1 
Shock in t-3 (-0.42) and t-1 
(-0.36) 
55 Mulhouse 1999 Mixed economy 
company 
55 
(53) 
21 in t-9 Women’s volley (2 in t-1 and t) 
Insolvency in t-10 
(21), 20 in t-9, 31 in 
t-8, 33 in t-7 and t-
6, 32 in t-5, t-4 and 
t-3, 31 in t-2, 40 in 
t-1 
Shock in t-5 (-0.31) and t (-
0.89) 
56 Martigues 2003 Mixed economy 
company 45 28 in t-8 
Marseille 
(3 vs. 9 in t-1) 
33 in t-12, 36 in t-
11, 21 in t-10, 18 in 
t-9, 11 in t-8, 20 in 
t-7, 23 in t-6, 39 in 
t-5, 51 in t-4, 42 in 
t-3, 38 in t-2, 40 in 
t-1 
Shock in t-4 (-0.59), t-2 (-
0.32) and t (-0.23) 
57 Alès 2003 Mixed economy 
company 55 30.5 in t-12 
Nîmes 
(50 vs. 39 in t-1) 
Between 24 and 40 
t-12/t-7, 54 and 68 
t-6/t-3, 51 in t-2, 48 
in t-1 
No shock in t, other data not 
available 
58 Valence 2005 Limited 
company 42 28 in t-7 - 
Between 25 and 33 
t-12/t-7, 38 in t-6, 
39 in t-5, 50 in t-4, 
43 in t-3, 33 in t-2, 
38 in t-1 
Shock in t-4 (-0.24), t-2 (-
0.24) and t-1 (-0.26) 
59 Racing Paris 2005 Limited 46 55 in t-5 Paris-Saint- Between 50 and 73 
t-12/t-7, 44 in t-6, Shock in t-4 (-0.67) and t-3 
37 
company Germain 
(9 vs. 2 in t-1) 
Stade Français 
Rugby 
(2 vs. 1 in t-1) 
Basket 
(5 vs. 13 in t-1) 
Handball 
(2 vs. 5 in t-1) 
Volley 
(5 vs. 4 in t-1) 
49 in t-5, 47 in t-4, 
financial difficulties 
in t-3 (54), 63 in t-
2, 61 in t-1 
(-0.26) 
60 Sète 2009 Mixed economy 
company 
47 46 in t-3 
Montpellier (22 in 
t vs. 28 in t-1) 
Volley 
(9 vs. 8 in t-1) 
50 in t-12, 64 in t-
11, 66 in t-10, 74 in 
t-9, 61 in t-8, 52 in 
t-7, 49 in t-6, 48 in 
t-5, 43 in t-4, 40 in 
t-3, 47 in t-2, 46 in 
t-1 
Shock in t-2 (-0.33) and t (-
0.35) 
61 Libourne-Saint-Seurin 2009 
Limited 
company 52 44 in t-1 
Bordeaux 
(1 vs. 2 in t-1) 
Between 65 and 85 
t-12/t-7, 61 in t-6, 
49 in t-5, 52 in t-4, 
43 in t-3, 37 in t-2, 
39 in t-1 
Shock in t-2 (-0.28) 
62 Grenoble 2011 Limited 
company 40 13 in t-2 
Rugby (16, D2 vs. 
20 in t-1) 
61 in t-12, 44 in t-
11, 41 in t-10, 
between 25 and 36 
Shock in t (-0.20) 
38 
Hockey (7 vs. 3 in 
t-1) 
t-9/t-4, 23 in t-3, 13 
in t-2, 20 in t-1 
63 RC Strasbourg 2011 
Limited 
company 44 9 in t-11 
Basket 
(11 vs. 14 in t-1) 
Hockey 
(2 vs. 5 in t-1) 
14 in t-12, 10 in t-
11, 20 in t-10, 22 in 
t-9, 13 in t-8 and t-
7, 11 in t-6, 19 in t-
5, 23 in t-4, 19 in t-
3, 24 in t-2, 39 in t-
1 
Shock in t-3 (-0.20) 
64 Gueugnon 2011 Limited 
company 
60 
(61) 
39 in t-5 - 
Between 25 and 36 
t-12/t-4, 40 in t-3, 
51 in t-2, 56 in t-1 
Shock in t-4 (-0.24) 
65 Cassis-Carnoux 2011 Association 
140 
(>569) 
withdraw 
60 in t-2 
Marseille 
(2 vs. 1 in t-1) 
Beyond 121 t-12/t-
10, 111 in t-9, 107 
in t-8, 102 in t-7, 81 
in t-6, 64 in t-5, 70 
in t-4, 61 in t-3, 54 
in t-2, 58 in t-1 
Data not available 
66 Besançon 2012 Limited 
company 
59 38 in t-8 Sochaux (14 vs. 5 in t-1) 
48 in t-12, 52 in t-
11, 50 in t-10, 41 in 
t-9, 39 in t-8, 57 in 
t-7, 75 in t-6, 62 in 
t-5 and t-4, 61 in t-3 
(financial 
difficulties), 64 in t-
2, 61 in t-1 
No shock in t, other data not 
available 
67 Gap 2012 Association 
80 
(129) 
57 in t-5 
Hockey 
(5 in t-1 and t) 
102 in t-12, 101 in 
t-11, 95 in t-10, 81 
in t-9, between 64 
and 70 t-8/t-5, 62 in 
t-4, 77 in t-3, 61 in 
No shock in t-1, other data 
not available 
39 
t-2, 56 in t-1 
(financial 
difficulties) 
68 Le Mans 2013 Limited 
company 38 16 in t-9 
Basket 
(5 vs. 2 in t-1) 
34 in t-12, 25 in t-
11, 22 in t-10, 19 in 
t-9, 22 in t-8, 11 in 
t-7, 12 in t-6, 9 in t-
5, 16 in t-4, 18 in t-
3, 24 in t-2, 37 in t-
1 
No shock 
69 Sedan 2013 Limited 
company 39 11 in t-11 - 
5 in t-12, 16 in t-11, 
19 in t-10, 25 in t-9, 
26 in t-8, 22 in t-7, 
19 in t-6, 24 in t-5, 
29 in t-4, 32 in t-3, 
25 in t-2, 24 in t-1 
Shock in t (-0.22) 
70 Rouen 2013 Limited 
company 
45 30 in t-9 
Hockey 
(1 in t-1 and t) 
Basket 
(25 vs. 30 in t-1) 
71 in t-12, 64 in t-
11, 43 in t-10, 40 in 
t-9, 59 in t-8, 63 in 
t-7, 66 in t-6, 62 in 
t-5, 61 in t-4, 52 in 
t-3, 48 in t-2, 46 in 
t-1 
No shock (-0.19 in t) 
71 Vannes 2014 Limited 
company 59 39 in t-4 
Lorient 
(8 in t-1 and t) 
65 in t-12, 75 in t-
11, 66 in t-10, 61 in 
t-9, 52 in t-8, 55 in 
t-7, 41 in t-6, 30 in 
t-5, 34 in t-4, 38 in 
t-3, 44 in t-2, 50 in 
t-1 
Shock in t-5 (-0.42) 
40 
72 Uzès 2014 Association 60 58 in t-1 
Nîmes 
(35 vs. 28 in t-1) 
121 at best t-12/t-9, 
113 in t-8, 101 in t-
7, 88 in t-6, 84 in t-
5, 82 in t-4, 75 in t-
3, 61 in t-2, 56 in t-
1 
Shock in t-1 (-0.20) 
1
 Local = same urban unity vs. departmental = not same urban unity but same department and better potential.  
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Data Appendix 2:  Information related to consequences of insolvencies in French football over the period 1970-2014 for each case 
 Club Season 
Ownership 
form when 
and after the 
event 
occurred 
“Normalised” 
sporting 
position 
(actual into 
brackets if 
different) 
Population 
2012 ranking 
(urban unity)1 
Local / 
departmental2 
competitor(s) 
“Normalised” 
position in t+1 
(and difference 
of levels 
compared to t)  
Able to regain the 
previous level 
(Yes/No) 
and time to do so 
1 AC Ajaccio 1975 Association 
40 
(56) 
withdraw 
98 GFCO Ajaccio 
75 
(2) 
Yes 
23 years 
2 Rouen 1978 Association 20 12 - 
25 
(1) 
Yes 
4 years 
3 Red Star 93 1978 Association 
23 
(25) 
1 - 
86 
(3) 
Yes 
4 years 
4 Rennes 1978 Association 
34 
(43) 
20 - 
28 
(0) 
- 
5 Reims 1979 Association 20 31 - 
26 
(1) 
Yes 
33 years 
6 Troyes 1979 Association 
39 
(53) 
50 - 
97 
(3) 
Yes 
17 years 
7 Marseille 1981 Association 26 3 - 23 - 
42 
(31) (0) 
8 Thionville 1981 Association 
26 
(31) 
51 Metz 
70 
(2) 
No 
9 Dunkerque 1981 Association 
38 
(51) 
38 Lille 
34 
(0) 
- 
10 Angers 1982 Association 
28 
(35) 
30 - 
34 
(0) 
- 
11 Valenciennes 1983 Association 
23 
(25) 
19 - 
25 
(0) 
- 
12 Stade Français 1985 Association 
35 
(45) 
1 
Paris-Saint-
Germain 
Stade Français 
Basket 
> 101 
(at least 4) 
No 
13 Besançon 1986 Association 
36 
(47) 
49 Sochaux 
79 
(2) 
Yes 
17 years 
14 Limoges 1987 Association 
27 
(33) 
37 Basket 
66 
(2) 
No 
15 Dunkerque 1987 Association 
28 
(35) 
38 Lille 
28 
(0) 
- 
16 Valenciennes 1987 Association 35 19 - 29 - 
43 
(45) (0) 
17 Thonon 1987 Association 
38 
(51) 
87 Annecy 
77 
(2) 
No 
18 Amiens 1987 Association 
39 
(53) 
45 - 
58 
(1) 
Yes 
4 years 
19 Bastia 1988 Association 
28 
(35) 
96 - 
25 
(0) 
- 
20 Mulhouse 1989 
Mixed 
economy 
company 
21 26 - 
20 
(-1) 
- 
21 Orléans 1989 Association 
31 
(39) 
23 - 
34 
(0) 
- 
22 Beauvais 1989 Association 
36 
(47) 
113 - 
26 
(0) 
- 
23 Sète 1989 Association 
37 
(49) 
68 
Montpellier 
Volley 
44 
(1) 
Yes 
16 years 
24 Grenoble 1990 Association 
38 
(51) 
11 
Hockey 
Rugby 
Volley 
42 
(1) 
Yes 
1 year 
25 Lorient 1990 Association 38 57 - 44 Yes 
44 
(51) (1) 2 years 
26 Abbeville 1990 Association 
39 
(53) 
205 Amiens 
100 
(3) 
No 
27 Quimper 1990 Association 
40 
(55) 
80 Brest 
45 
(1) 
No 
28 Bordeaux 1991 Association 10 7 
Rugby 
Volley 
Handball 
Hockey 
21 
(1) 
Yes 
1 year 
29 Nice 1991 Association 14 5 Cannes 
30 
(1) 
Yes 
3 years 
30 Niort 1991 Association 
37 
(49) 
91 - 
41 
(1) 
Yes 
1 year 
31 Chaumont 1991 Association 
39 
(53) 
236 - 
93 
(3) 
No 
32 Dijon 1991 Association 
40 
(55) 
27 Basket 
61 
(2) 
Yes 
13 years 
33 Orléans 1992 Association 
39 
(53) 
23 - 
93 
(3) 
Yes 
22 years 
45 
34 Brest 1992 Association 
40 
(56) 
withdraw 
33 - 
43 
(1) 
Yes 
12 years 
35 Reims 1992 Association 
46 
(87) 
31 
Basket 
Hockey 
93 
(2) 
Yes 
7 years 
36 Rodez 1993 Association 
36 
(47) 
130 - 
63 
(2) 
No 
37 La Roche 1994 
Limited 
company 
(minority 
blocking 
rights for the 
supportive 
association) 
47 
(55) 
124 - 
46 
(0) 
- 
38 Annecy 1994 
Limited 
company 
(minority 
blocking 
rights for the 
supportive 
association) 
60 
(77) 
46 - 
> 121 
(4) 
No 
39 Nevers 1994 Association 
60 
(77) 
108 Formula 1 (Magny-Cours) Disappearance - 
40 Tours 1994 Association 
74 
(123) 
18 Volley 
76 
(0) 
- 
46 
41 Marseille 1995 
Limited 
company 
(minority 
blocking 
rights for the 
supportive 
association) 
21 3 
Marseille 
Vitrolles 
Handball 
22 
(0) 
- 
42 Rouen 1995 Association 
46 
(53) 
12 Hockey 
68 
(1) 
Yes 
7 years 
43 Bourges 1995 
Mixed 
economy 
company 
47 
(55) 
76 Women’s Basket 
61 
(1) 
Yes 
1 year 
44 Pau 1995 Association 
54 
(65) 
35 Basket 
67 
(1) 
Yes 
3 years 
45 Valenciennes 1996 Association 
43 
(47) 
19 - 
65 
(1) 
Yes 
2 years 
46 Roubaix 1996 Association 
60 
(78) 
withdraw 
4 Lille 
>121 
(at least 4) 
No 
47 Perpignan 1997 Association 
34 
(36) 
36 Rugby 
119 
(4) 
No 
48 Saint-Brieuc 1997 Association 
40 
(42) 
63 Guingamp 
97 
(3) 
No 
47 
49 Quimper 1997 Association 
53 
(63) 
80 Brest 
121 
(4) 
No 
50 Toulon 1998 Association 38 9 
Rugby 
Basket 
113 
(4) 
No 
51 Poitiers 1998 Association 47 52 Volley 
80 
(1) 
No 
52 Epinal 1998 Association 56 104 - 
108 
(3) 
Yes 
13 years 
53 Charleville 1998 Association 
60 
withdraw 
105 Sedan 
108 
(3) 
No 
54 Bourges 1998 
Mixed 
economy 
company 
60 
withdraw 
76 Women’s Basket 
101 
(3) 
No 
55 Mulhouse 1999 
Mixed 
economy 
company 
55 
(53) 
26 Women’s Volley 
71 
(1) 
No 
56 Martigues 2003 
Mixed 
economy 
company 
45 3 Marseille 
63 
(1) 
Yes 
3 years 
57 Alès 2003 
Mixed 
economy 
company 
55 64 Nîmes 
104 
(3) 
No 
58 Valence 2005 Limited 42 53 - 104 No 
48 
company (3) 
59 Racing Paris 2005 Limited 
company 46 1 
Paris-Saint-
Germain 
Stade Français 
Rugby 
Basket 
Handball 
Volley 
78 
(1) 
No 
60 Sète 2009 
Mixed 
economy 
company 
47 68 
Montpellier 
Volley 
104 
(3) 
No 
61 Libourne-Saint-Seurin 2009 
Limited 
company 52 115 Bordeaux 
70 
(1) 
No 
62 Grenoble 2011 Limited 
company 40 11 
Rugby 
Hockey 
81 
(3) 
No 
63 RC Strasbourg 2011 Limited 
company 
44 13 
Basket 
Hockey 
81 
(2) 
Yes 
2 years 
64 Gueugnon 2011 Limited 
company 
60 
(61) 
>272 - 
110 
(3) 
No 
65 Cassis-Carnoux 2011 Association 
140 
(>569) 
158 Marseille 
>181 
(3) 
Yes (Carnoux) 
4 years 
49 
66 Besançon 2012 Limited 
company 59 49 Sochaux 
121 
(4) 
Not possible 
67 Gap 2012 Association 
80 
(129) 
148 Hockey 
161 
(5) 
Not possible 
68 Le Mans 2013 Limited 
company 38 32 Basket 
101 
(4) 
Not possible 
69 Sedan 2013 Limited 
company 39 204 - 
82 
(3) 
Not possible 
70 Rouen 2013 Limited 
company 45 12 
Hockey 
Basket 
108 
(3) 
Not possible 
71 Vannes 2014 Limited 
company 59 83 Lorient 
121 
(4) 
Not possible 
72 Uzès 2014 Association 60 183 Nîmes 
100 
(2) 
Not possible 
1
 Only population 2012 ranking is reported here even if this is not the most appropriate in cases when a club regained or could have regained its previous level 
before 2012. However, population 2012 ranking still provides a good idea of the range where a population lies at any time over the period 1970-2014. 
2
 Local = same urban area vs. departmental = not same urban area but same department and better potential. 
 
 
 
